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H.umAs· CoRPus-lNADEQUACY OP STATB Rmm»Y-Petitioner had pleaded
guilty to a criminal indictment and was sentenced to prison by an Illinois circuit
court. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus, based upon an alleged denial of
due process at trial, was denied without hearing. The lliinois Supreme Court in
People 11. Loftus,1 decided in 1949, seems squarely to have held that habeas corpus
is a proper post-trial proceeding for hearing charges of denial of due process. Since
the Illinois Supreme Court does not review habeas corpus proceedings in the circuit court, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, remanded
to the lliinois circuit court to determine whether, in the light of the Loftiis decision, the writ of habeas corpus should be granted. Young v. Ragen,. 337 U.S. 235,
69 S.Ct. 1073 (1949).
Since .Ex parte Hawk,2 the United States courts have steadfastly refused to
hear charges of denial of federal constitutional rights unless petitioner has exhausted all state procedures for hearing such charges. At the same time the United
States courts have insisted that, before the doctrine of .Ex parte Hawk ·will be
applied, the s'tates must provide adequate remedies. Illinois has three post-trial
remedies. 3 But the Court in the principal case is of the opinion that none of these

1400 ill. 432, 81 N.E. (2d) (1949).
321 U.S.114, 64 S.Ct. 448 (1944).
8 (I) Writ of error: Upon which only the common law mandatory record is reviewed.
People v. Loftus, 400 ill. 432, 81 N.E. (2d) (1949). This remedy is obviously inappropriate
for such commonly alleged denials of due process as a lack of attorney and coerced confessions.
(2) A statutory writ of error coram nobis. ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 110, §72. This motion
has proved ineffective for most due process questions because the reviewing court must confine its review to facts, and only those facts of which the trial judge was not aware. In addi2
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remedies are adequate unless the scope of the writ of habeas corpus has been
enlarged by the Lo~us decision to include hearings on charges of denial of procedural due process. In Woods v. Nierstheimer4 the United States Supreme Court
noted the limited scope of habeas corpus in Illinois. Although the petitioner had
been given no hearing, the Court decided that there were adequate non-federal
grounds for refusing habeas corpus since this writ was a proper remedy in Illinois
only to consider allegations that the trial court lacked initial jurisdiction,5 or, that
subsequent events had rendered the judgment void. 6 As cases continued to appear
from Illinois it became evident that prisoners there had no adequate remedy.7 By
a concurring opinion in Marino v. Ragen,8 Justice Rutledge gave notice that the
Supreme Court was exhausting its patience; it was his opinion that Illinois procedural remedies were completely inadequate and that the Hawk doctrine should
not be applied. The United States Supreme Court ·subsequently requested a
clarification of the extent and scope of Illinois procedural remedies. The clarification was attempted in People v. Loftus.9 The Illinois Supreme Court, in an
apparent extension of the writ of habeas corpus, announced that a lack of due
process rendered a judgment void; that habeas corpus was, therefore, an appropriate remedy for due process hearings. The remand of the principal case will
require an Illinois circuit court interpretation of the Loftus decision. The decision
may be followed and habeas corpus made available for denial of due process hearings; if not, it is very likely that the United States Supreme Court will decide that
Illinois has no adequate post-trial remedy and allow Illinois prisoners to petition
directly to the federal courts.
Joseph Gricar

tion, a live year period oE limitations on this writ has been declared constitutional by the
Illinois Supreme Court. People v. Rave, 392 ID. 435, 65 N.E. (2d) 23 (1946). (3) Habeas
Corpus.
328 U.S. 211, 66 S.Ct. 996 (1946).
Swolley v. Ragen, 390 ID. 106, 61 N.E. (2d) 248 (1946). See 42 ILL.
L. REv. 329 at 334, n. 34 (1947), for additional citations.
6 People ex rel. Courtney v. Thompson, 358 ID. 81, 192 N.E. 693 (1934).
7 For a detailed treatment oE the procedural confusion facing petitioners in Illinois, see
47 Mi:cH. L. REv. 72 (1948); 42 !LL. L. REv. 329 (1947); 15 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 107 at
118 (1947).
s 332 U.S. 561, 68 S.Ct. 240 (1947).
o 400 ID. 432, 81 N.E. (2d) 495 (1949).
4

5 People ex rel.

